

MILITARY
S K E T C H E S

OF THE

Goorka War,

IN INDIA,

IN THE YEARS 1814, 1815, 1816.

Ac mihi quidem, tametsi haudquaquam par gloria sequatur scriptorem, et actorem rerum; tamen in primis arduum videtur, res gestas scribere: primùm quòd facta dictis exæquanda sunt: dein, quia plerique, quæ delicta reprehenderis, malevolentia, et invidia dicta putant: ubi de magnâ virtute atque gloria bonorum memores; quæ sibi quisque facilia factu putet, æquo animo accipit; suprâ, veluti ficta pro falsis ducit. SALLUST.

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TO VIND
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HENRY MORSE STEPHENS

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GOORKA. The ancient Principality of the Rajahs of Nepal. Its Inhabitants bear the same name, and hence the people of the whole Nepalese Empire are commonly called Goorkas.

KADJI. The title of Amer Sing. It may be translated "Councillor of State," though some think it equivalent to "Captain-General."

RANGE. The word is used in this Narrative to denote a chain of hills having a common base with distinct summits.

THE mode of spelling oriental words recommended by Sir William Jones is generally followed, except where custom has sanctioned a different orthography.

STAFF OF THE ARMY

WHICH INVADED

THE NEPALESE PROVINCE OF HINDUR,

In 1814,

Under the command of

Major-General David Dchterlong.



Major of Brigade, Capt. Edmund Cartwright.
Officiating Aid-de-Camp, Lieut. Peter Lawtie.
Field-Engineer and Surveyor, .. Lieut. Peter Lawtie.
Assistant ditto ditto Ensign Geo. Hutchinson.
Assistant Commissary-General, Lieut. Alex. Bannerman.
Sub-Assistant ditto, Lieut. Sneyd.



Commanding the Line, Brigadier John Arnold.
_____ Reserve, Lieut.-Col. A. Thompson.
_____ Artillery, Major Alex. M'cLeod.

ERRATA.

- Page 2, l. 1, for *Jaspar Nichols* read *Jasper Nicolls*.
5 — 19, for *wheels* read *wheel*.
7 — 17, for *trains* read *train*.
8 — 3, for *Rotka* read *Kotka*.
8 — 11, for *Wookeries* read *Kookeries*.
13 — 2, for *reserved* read *reserve*.
14 — 15, for *too* read *to*.
16 — 3, for *Iatuck* read *Jaituck*.
18 — 14, for *69th Reg.* read *67th Reg.*
18 — 22, for *exceptions* read *exception*.
18 — 29, for *Nichols* read *Nicolls*.
22 — 2, for *Baudula* read *Bandula*.
22 — 17, for *Fulsuri* read *Tulsuri*.
26 — 25, for *Denntil* read *Deuntil*.
36 — 5, for *Poynty* read *Poyntz*.
38 — 18, for *rotten* read *rotting*.
40 — 19, for *Buhakoh* read *Bichakoh*.
41 — 4, for *Milla* read *Nulla*.
43 — 12, for *succeeding* read *succeeded*.
45 — 23, for *route* read *rout*.

INTRODUCTION.

THE notes from which the following narrative has been compiled, were taken in the field, from personal observation, and from the testimony of those who achieved what I here attempt to describe. Returning to Europe six years after the war, I reduced my sketches nearly into their present form during the voyage; intending, when I should reach England, by interweaving other fragments, to compose an entire history of the Goorka war. But as the requisite documents could not be procured, I relinquished the design with all thoughts of publication.

When the present condition of the Indian army was expected to come under consideration last summer, I conceived that an account of its operations in the Nepalese provinces, might be

acceptable to an officer holding an important and confidential situation, at home, whose advice was likely to influence the decision of the Court of Directors, relative to some proposed changes in their Military system. My motives were duly appreciated in this quarter: and in acknowledgment of the manuscript, which had been presented by a friend, I received a polite communication, stating objections to my prominent opinions, but concluding with an exhortation to publish what I had written.

Conscious of owing this encouragement, to the subject, and to a reliance on the accuracy of my statements, I do not seek to divest myself of the responsibility which attaches to an author.

Neither afraid nor willing to offend the unreasonable, I am at the same time, very anxious that my own views of the tendency of this tract should be perfectly understood by the liberal and enlightened reader. Many feelings may naturally arise in arms against the presumption of a person who, in the obscurity of civil life, opposes his opinions to the recorded experience of Clive, Laurence, of Malcom, and even of

Wellington; especially in endeavouring to demonstrate a material deficiency in the constitution of that military force, to which we are believed to owe the acquisition and the preservation of British India. Yet, as proximity impedes the sight, the most distinguished members of a profession are frequently the last to perceive its wants and defects. If these exist, to a serious extent, in the service of the East India Company, whilst they can be remedied, I shall have discharged a duty to my employers in disclosing the truth.

Next to injuring the Public Body with whose prosperity my own welfare is intimately connected, there is nothing which I deprecate more than the ill will of any part of the Bengal army.

I shall therefore, in relation to some facts and inferences, to be found in the subsequent Sketches, endeavour to conciliate, what appear to me, the honest prejudices of many officers in favour of the Native Soldiery.

I begin by disclaiming all accordance with those who imagine the colour of Asiatics to indicate an inferior race of beings. The Sea-

poys are men created exactly like Britons, but living in a different stage of civilization and intellectual developement. Like every people in the same condition, their only courage is apathy, and their valour consists in animal ferocity.— The persevering power to inflict and suffer, possessed by Europeans, is a mental endowment, not bestowed by nature, but derived from an artificial state of society. When the passions of an Indian are roused, he will face death in obedience to their impulse: but he has no reflective faculty, no internal energy, which urges him to persist after they subside.

A native soldier, of whatever rank, has no heroism, and he is ignorant of honour in every acceptation of the word. Without owing natural allegiance, or having any incentive to serve us, less ignoble than his pay, he is in our hands no better than a living machine. What the men do not possess within themselves must be communicated by the officers: and to effect this important object an addition of Europeans to the native regiments is indispensable.

We may consider an army as divided into two portions, the intellectual and the physical.

In a British force, consisting wholly of one people, these blend and run insensibly into one another. In the Indian service, however, a tangible line of separation appears between them: they are formed of distinct nations.

That moral excitement, therefore, which should pass like electricity through a conducting body, meets here with a great and obvious impediment: while it wants surface and points from whence to impart its influence to the passive materials. But, dropping these metaphors, let us appeal in plain language to the facts as they exist. Are we not justifiable in believing that a thousand semi-barbarous Asiatics would require more officers to guide them, in the day of battle, than an equal number of British soldiers? yet they never have so many, and seldom more than one half. As an apposite example, it was calculated that the number of officers employed with their corps during the Nepal war did not exceed the proportion of one to a hundred Seapoys.

The efficiency of some departments, securing a final triumph to our arms on most occasions, impresses many with a conviction that the whole

system is excellent. It were desirable, for various reasons, that the world should always know by what means battles are gained. But while official dispatches are regarded as affording correct and authentic information on such subjects, the public must submit to be often deceived. Indeed, some of the best qualities of human nature will become dormant, in the writers, before they shall bring themselves to divulge, on all occasions, the whole truth.

We cannot expect a victorious General, for instance, to stigmatize his men, and most likely give pain to some officers, whose feelings are too frequently employed in palliating conduct which it were their interest to expose.

I believe every campaign in India to have owed its success and glory to three great causes, singly or in conjunction. The talents of the Commander: the services of Europeans: and the Civil resources of the State. The influence of the last might be the most difficult to demonstrate; yet I feel confident that the Company has, at least, one officer who could undertake, with the present Commissariat, to drive

the army of any native Prince from the plains, without shedding blood.

The Goorka war was well calculated to unveil the weak points of a defective system.

The grand movements being necessarily offensive, the subordinate operations, on the most trying occasions, assumed a defensive character. The duties imposed were certainly arduous, perhaps beyond precedent in the annals of India: yet a little reflection will shew that they devolved chiefly on what I have stiled the intellectual portion of the army. The combats had to be conducted over hills, through forests, and across ravines, without being subjected to a contest with the enemy on disadvantageous terms.

If the great axiom of the art of destruction be to overwhelm, in detail, separate points of an enemy's line, with superior numbers, the difficulties in actual conflict, fell also on the Commanders.

After we have ascended a mountain in safety, a detached peak or ridge, is just as easily taken and defended, as a knoll or fence, on the plains. The fragment, the projection, of a rock, is no

greater impediment to the thrust of a bayonet than to the stroke of a sword. It matters not at present which weapon is preferable. The only advantage that I perceived on the side of the Goorkas, was the alacrity which habit had given them in finding their way over uneven ground, in pursuit or flight. This circumstance, however, has no effect in justifying our men for yielding to attacks which they were drawn up to receive. But reducing the question to a narrow compass: when, let me ask, was the line of the Seapoys ever broken, or their charge arrested, in physical collision with the enemy?

The conclusive answer must admit that they turned, almost uniformly, from the contest before a blow had been struck, under the influence of a moral impulse, which deterred them from proving the badness of the ground and the inferiority of the bayonet.

The discomfiture of our fighting men, in several of the actions which are recorded here, cannot be a subject of dispute, however variously different individuals may explain the occurrence.

It is well known indeed that two people

engaged in a battle will seldom give the same account of the particulars: and both are ready to contradict a third person, who has seen all the movements in combination. The combatant, we may remark, is an actor who performs but one part in the drama, generally ignorant of the plan, and remaining quite unconscious of the impressions which a spectator receives from an undisturbed view of the whole. We can trust authorities of this class in relating what they did, but rarely in what they thought was doing around them.

Those who, like myself, witnessed the transactions without sharing in their danger or glory, might feel objections, of another kind, to my descriptions. This apparent disagreement, again, in the evidence, will be explained when we recollect what number of unimportant circumstances attend every event, where multitudes are concerned, which it is necessary to suppress, in order to facilitate the apprehension of a reader: though this divestment must render the naked fact less easily recognized, by one who witnessed it originally with all its concomitants.

Bearing these exceptions in mind, I appeal for confirmation of my statements, to the officers who distinguished themselves in the different engagements: and to all the Artillery who served at Neher, Dibu, Malown, and Mackwanpore.

After asserting my rectitude of intention, and claiming accuracy commensurate with the Author's judgement, I shall be equally ready to acknowledge the scanty pretensions of this work in other respects. It records in reality, no more than my individual evidence, together with the opinions which I formed on the testimony of others, as has just been stated.


And, not hoping for concealment in addressing the Indian community, of which every member is more or less known to the rest, I am bound to mention that no person with whom I was publicly or privately associated in India, is yet aware that I ever intended to write or to publish concerning the Goorka war.

To those who have endured the languor of a mind unoccupied amidst the tumult of a campaign, or in the monotony of a long voyage, the Author's motives for writing, and the cha-

acter of his composition need no explanation. The reader however may be warned of some peculiarities which, if liable to objection, he will perhaps consider errors of taste, rather than serious defects.

I have generally avoided, by a periphrasis, such military terms as are not naturalized in the English language. Praise and blame, when plainly inferable from the facts recorded, are seldom expressed: and in arrogating the privilege of bestowing direct commendation, where conflicting circumstances might leave a stranger in doubt, I, for the most part, repeat the encomiums of the constituted authorities.

The work of Mr. Prinsep has already made the public acquainted with the political transactions of the period, and the policy of the Bengal government in commencing hostilities. My attempt is limited to an account of military operations. If successful, it may prove some addition to a portion of Indian history, which will hereafter attract deeper attention than it could command during the contest with Nepal, when the affairs of Europe, on a more magnificent theatre, absorbed universal interest.



Military Sketches

OF THE

GOORKA WAR.

THE mountainous empire of Nepal, extending in breadth from the plains of India to the snowy regions of Tibet, stretches along the British frontier nearly 1500 miles between the Barampootra and Setledge rivers. The numerous principalities, west of the Gogra, had been subjugated since the beginning of the century, and continued at the commencement of this war, under the controul of their conqueror, Amer Sing.

The government of Fort William having determined on hostilities, adequate preparations were made for invading, at the most vulnerable points, a country so strongly fortified by nature and defended by a courageous people.

Major-General Marley was appointed to move from Dinapore, with the most numerous body of troops, on Catmanda, the enemy's capital.

Major-General Sullivan Wood had instructions to penetrate through Bootual.

Colonel Jaspar Nichols, quarter-master-general of the King's forces, commanded the division against Camoan.

Major-General Gillespie assembled his army at Saharunpore, to invade Sirmur, or that portion of Amer Sing's government under the direction of his son Runjore.

Major-General Ochterlony marched from Lodiana, against the territory which is governed by that chief in person.

It being my intention to record those events only, of which I was an eye witness, or concerning which I obtained authentic information on the spot, at the time of their occurrence, the following narrative is confined to General Ochterlony's movements: though the operations of other divisions are occasionally alluded to, for the sake of illustration.

Oct. 1814.—Colonel Mawbey, of H. M. 53d. regt. who preceded General Gillespie, had advanced upon the small frontier fort of Calunga, where, meeting with an unexpected resistance, he found it prudent to relinquish the attack, until his force should be prepared for a regular siege.

The general arriving in person a few days after, ordered an assault by escalade. The troops were repulsed with great slaughter. Gillespie probably thinking to retrieve the day [*Oct.* 29th.] by setting an example of entre-

pidity, was slain while proceeding to the scaling ladders, at the head of some dismounted troopers of the 8th dragoons.

Nothing could be imagined more inauspicious than such a commencement of the campaign, among a superstitious and ignorant people.

General Ochterlony having crossed the plain from Lodiana, had just encamped before a similar fort called Nallaghur, when intelligence of the disaster at Calunga reached his army. The force under his command consisted ultimately of 6000 native infantry, two hundred pioneers, and two companies of European artillery. The irregulars, as they were called, or men furnished by the Seik chiefs under British protection, and by the dispossessed Rajah of Hindur, though they were never mustered, may be reckoned 4000 in number.

Nallaghur, which was now to be invested, is considered the key to the principality of Hindur, and the more northern districts, held by the Goorkas in this quarter.

It is situated close to the border of the plain, on an eminence at the top of a steep acclivity between two considerable hills. The only road to the ascent passes through several hollows, the beds of small rivers in the rainy season, which now exhibit large stones and fragments of rock obstructing the way. The

ground is every where covered with jungle, consisting chiefly of bamboos and various thorny shrubs. Of Nallaghur, and of these hill-forts in general, it may be remarked here, that they derive almost their whole importance from position. They are not constructed according to any principles of science. Their form is made to suit the spot on which they are built: and we consequently find them of all shapes. After the Indian manner the walls are high with a parapet, and round towers, rather than bastions, at the corners, the whole having many loop-holes. The shot of their heaviest artillery weighs only about four pounds: but their most serviceable engines for defence, are a sort of swivels, called Gingalls. One of these not exceeding double the size and weight of a musket, is easily carried, and a single person can work it. The Goorkas have many of them in all their posts; and throwing balls which weigh 3 or 4 ounces, to a great distance, they do far more execution than cannon, in the hands of such artillerists.

Nov.—The 3rd native infantry and the light companies of the different battalions being formed into a corps of reserve, under Lieut.-Col. Thompson, were put in motion during the night of the 2nd. They succeeded before day-light in occupying all the commanding heights; cutting off the communica-

tion with Tarraghur, a dependant post which is but a square tower without wall or ditch around it; and the enemy were soon driven from the ruins of an old tower adjoining the fort. The pioneers having previously got ready the fascines, erected a battery within 225 paces of the wall. To transport the heavy guns over a road so rough and steep, at first appeared to many an impracticable undertaking: and it certainly would have cost much time and labour had the strength and docility of the elephant not been put in requisition. The eighteen-pounders were now dragged from the camp by working parties of the troops, each followed by one, or where there was room, by two elephants. This animal, as the nature of the impediment required, sometimes applying his proboscis to the circumference of the carriage wheels, would at once lift and push it forward; sometimes twisting the same trunk round one of the spokes, he would raise the wheel out of a hollow, or over a projecting piece of rock: and, when the ground became tolerably even, a sign of the driver made him lay his forehead to the gun carriage in order to hurl it along. By this means the battering train arrived in perfect order, and opened on the morning of the 4th. The walls being constructed of the best stone and mortar, two eighteen-pounders played about twenty-four hours on an angle of

the fort, before a practicable breach could be effected. The enemy, besides keeping up a constant fire, shewed their determination to stand a storm, by piling heaps of large stones on the ramparts, with the apparent intention of precipitating them on the assailants.

A battery of six-pounders was now directed against these preparations. The shot shivering and dispersing the stones, not only cleared the ramparts, but drove their own missiles among the besieged like discharges of grape. The Goorkas were by this time convinced that resistance would be useless. Chumra Rana, the commandant, accordingly sent two Bramins to the general to treat for a capitulation. It was finally agreed that the fort, with Tarraghur, should be immediately delivered up, the garrison surrendering as prisoners of war. It appeared that many of them had stolen out and made their escape: but one hundred fighting men were thus taken and conveyed to Lodiana. The loss sustained on either side was trifling. The only European killed was a serjeant of pioneers, who exposing himself on the shoulder of the battery, received a Gingall shot in the head.

The pass into the hills being now gained, intelligence arrived, that Amer Sing had dispatched a party of his troops 1100 strong, to fortify the intervening heights, and to attack

the British in their progress to Ramghur. This design however was frustrated by the alacrity of the reserve.

8th.—Lieut.-Colonel Thompson with his corps marched during the night, and on the following day appeared upon the hill which fronts the centre of the long chain of posts belonging to Ramghur. The elephants brought up the field pieces, one being allowed for the barrel, and another for the carriage, of each six-pounder. The enemy had begun to stockade the very spot on which our troops now bivouacked, but retired on their approach.

The pioneers assisted by a multitude of the Rajah of Hindur's stone-cutters, next commenced the making of a road for the battering trains, where no wheel had ever rolled before. Many abrupt ascents and declivities had to be made into easy slopes: ledges or fences were raised, to prevent fatal accidents on the brinks of precipices: it was also found necessary to fell trees and blast the rocks in innumerable places, in order to open the way. Before the line, with the heavy artillery, could join the reserve, the field engineer had, at great personal hazard, reconnoitred all the enemy's positions. Amer Sing himself had taken post there at the head of the flower of his army, determined to dispute the only tract by which the invaders could pass into the interior of his

government. The Goorka right rested upon the fort of Ramghur, and their left upon a fortified peak, about two miles eastward, called Rotka Tiba, whilst the intervening hills were covered with stockades. This mode of fortifying places is admirably suited to the nature of the country, and the habits of the people. The most commanding and least accessible spot being chosen, every man sets to work. They carry with them every where all the necessary instruments. One party take their Wookeries (very large crooked knives) to cut down timber of the requisite size; and another commence operations on the ground with shovels and pickaxes. An inner and an outer circle (oblong, trapezium, or whatever be the form) of stakes is then driven into the soil, those in the same line being connected by means of smaller trees or branches woven between them; when the intermediate space is filled up with loose stones and earth. The Goorkas will, in this manner, erect a strong stockade in almost as little time as an equal number of our men usually require to pitch their tents.

So strong did these works render Amer Sing's position that it would have been impossible to force it. Neither could the army advance farther by the direct route. Under these circumstances, General Ochterlony having only the alternative of leaving the enemy

in his rear, and greatly dispersing his force, resolved to take possession of the hill of Candni, beyond their left, and thence to proceed to the valley of Neher, which lies behind the Goorka posts. To mask his intention, however, the battering train was brought up to the side of the stream that runs in front of Ramghur, and left there with a battalion of the 19th N. I. Leaving the 6th N. I. in charge of a depôt at Candni, the remainder of the force completed this movement, and encamped at Neher without opposition. The field-pieces and mortars arriving on elephants, with the troops, a battery was soon erected within range of the principal stockade, that seemed to defend the road to Ramghur, by which the heavy guns ought to approach it. No attempt was made to form a breach with the six-pounders; and they could not be brought to bear on the enemy otherwise. Abundance of shells were thrown here, and during the rest of the campaign: but the Goorkas, like other Indians, while their fortifications last, are not easily intimidated by any kind of projectiles, and these did no execution. With the intention of discovering and taking up a better position for the battery, the field engineer set out with a party of one hundred Seapoys, commanded by an European officer. They had reached a neighbouring eminence without molestation,

when a heavy fire of musketry (or matchlocks) suddenly opened upon them from a breast-work in front. To Lawtie it appeared more hazardous to retreat than to advance: and he instantly resolved on making an attack, instead of receiving one. The men being ordered to charge, rushed forward and dislodged the Goorkas with great gallantry. Thus far had the spirit of the officers actuated their men. But, when the enemy getting reinforced, came back with superior numbers, to retake their post, the Seapoys could not be prevented from wasting their ammunition, by keeping up a useless fire as their opponents were approaching. The upper layer of their cartridges being at last expended, some voices called out for a retreat, alleging, as a reason, that they would not have time to turn the boxes. The place appeared tenable with the bayonet: the Goorkas, however, were now at hand, and arguments, threats, and entreaties, proved equally vain to avert the disaster which ensued. Our men broke in confusion and turned their backs: the enemy, plunging among the fugitives, cut to pieces all whom their swords could reach. At this time a small reinforcement, all that could be spared from the battery, was ascending the same hill under Lieut. Williams, of the 3d N.I. It appeared the intention of that young officer to throw his party between

Lawtie's and their pursuers. But he had the mortification to see his Seapoys turn about and join in the flight, just before he perished himself under the weapons of the advancing enemy. In this and other instances the Goorkas showed their barbarity by mutilating the dead. It were injustice to the native soldiers here, not to mention the conduct of a few, who attended their European officers, and repeatedly saved their lives during this retreat. Such was the first encounter which any part of this army had with the Goorkas.

A far more calamitous event, however, occurred soon after at Calunga, the scene of a former defeat. Colonel Mawbey resuming the command after General Gillespie's death, had [Nov. 27.] effected a breach in the fort, and prepared to storm it. The attempt failed after a dreadful loss of officers and men. The place was then beleagured and a strict blockade enforced, till the commander, Bulbudder, a nephew of Amer Sing, sallying out with his garrison, they cut their way through the cordon, and took post on a neighbouring hill. A few nights afterwards Major Ludlow, of the 6th N. I. marching thither and surprising the enemy, gained a complete victory.

Dec. 1814.—Circumstances now compelled General Ochterlony to remain stationary nearly a month. Before this expedition scarcely any

information of use, in the guidance of military operations, had been obtained respecting these hills. Beyond Ramghur, the country and the nature of the enemy's defences were still unknown. The commander was, therefore, unable to direct a single movement of the army, until he had discovered the number and topographical position of Amer Sing's fortifications, and the routes by which troops might approach them. The range that Ramghur is situated upon, extending far to the north-west, has three other forts, besides stockades, on its most commanding and inaccessible summits. Beyond these, between the Gumber and Gumerora rivers, the fortified range of Malown stretches nearly east and west: and running parallel between it and the fort of Ramghur, is the chain of hills called Dibu. Malown may be considered Amer Sing's base of operations, whence he drew all supplies: and as Dibu intersected his line of communication, it was strongly stockaded.

It was accordingly resolved by the general that the enemy should next be assailed in this point. Some defences, in imitation of the Goorka system, had been thrown up at Candni, where a single battalion protected our rear, keeping open the communication. The second battalion of the 7th N. I. and 2000 Seiks, who had not yet joined, arriving at this time, a movement immediately took place.

Dec. 27th.—Colonel Thompson having the reserved reinforced by an additional corps, marched during the night, and gained the heights of Dibu, under the enemy's fire, early in the morning. As soon as the six-pounders could be taken from the elephant's backs, they were directed against a small stockade which it seemed expedient to reduce: but night came on, before any impression had been made on the works. Another redoubt of the same construction, but of great strength and extent, occupied the centre of the range, called Mungu Kedar, with the commander of which Amer Sing was much dissatisfied for allowing our troops to make any lodgement on this chain of hills. This person, in his justification, exaggerated the number and means of his adversary. The Kadji in consequence took the desperate resolution of withdrawing his men from all the posts east of Ramghur, and of proceeding with them in person to Mungu Kedar.

28th.—The day had scarcely dawned when 2000 men issued from this post to attack Col. Thompson's camp. A body of Goorkas, advancing to the charge, bears no resemblance to a European column. Several huge trumpets, putting forth a harsh but stirring noise, set the multitude in motion, who, except some that carry shields, grasping each a matchlock in his left hand, and a broad sword in his right,

rush on, disregarding all regularity, very like a pack of hounds in full cry.

Our Seapoys though they had only to stand up to find themselves in order of battle, could not be made to use the bayonet in united masses. Those whom the enemy approached deserted their posts, and it is said, some forgot their duty so far as to call out that the detachment should retreat. The Goorkas assailing the camp, in several parties, wherever the ground promised access, began once more to make havoc with their swords. The natural difficulties however impeded them greatly. A few men more impetuous than the rest, had penetrated too near the middle of the lines, when one of them was shot by Lieut. Armstrong of the pioneers, and the others fled backwards. Some of the Seapoys also, within the immediate grasp of their European officers, behaved well: Captain Hamilton, of the 7th, and Lieut. Culley, of the 1st, N. I. opposed their companies to a party of the enemy advancing by a projecting ridge, which was called a neck of land, and kept them in check by an irregular fire. Meanwhile, it was discovered that the leader of the main body had committed an error which might not have been expected. Instead of giving the rein to his men's impetuosity, at the first point which they reached, he halted them at the bottom of a steep ascent,

for the purpose, perhaps, of assaulting the camp where it might be least defended. Colonel Thompson soon availed himself of the delay which this disposition necessarily produced. Collecting together his own company of the 3rd. and some others from the rear, he placed them on a spot which enfiladed the enemy: and thence directing their fire among the crowd, it told so heavily that the Goorkas relinquished the attempt. The other parties seeing this one retire, followed its example, but not precipitately. Their retreat seemed to commence with sullen reluctance: and it was continued under the fire of the artillery, which had also galled their approach, assisted now by a loud roar of musketry.

The advantage accruing from the retention of this important position, and the discomfiture of the enemy, was not confined to mere progression, and the interruption of Amer Sing's communication: nor to the possession that we consequently obtained of all the evacuated stockades, which rendered secure our future intercourse with the plain. It occurred most opportunely, though it could not counterbalance a series of misfortunes, which about this time had nearly proved fatal to our military name in the east. Major-General Martindell having superseded Colonel Mawbey, after the evacuation of Calunga, proceeded with the

army towards Nahn, which was abandoned at his approach. Runjore had concentrated his forces in the fort of Iaituck and the adjoining posts, where he was now to sustain an attack from this army.

Dec. 29th.—Two columns, each led by a company of H. M. 53rd regt. marched on this service. Major Ludlow, already mentioned, commanded the one, which was to form a lodgement near the walls of this fort. In ascending the hill on which it stands, the greater part of his men fell behind: but no sooner had he, with the Europeans, and some flank companies, reached the summit, than he saw the propriety of taking immediate possession of a stockade, which seemed slightly defended. Calculating on the rest of his party being certainly up, before the enemy could get reinforced, he pushed forward with every hope of attaining the object of his movement. Scarcely had he taken this place, when an overwhelming number of Goorkas, sallying from Iaituck, attacked him on all sides. Looking back for the remainder of his force, he saw only some European officers, who having heard the firing, and being unable to bring up their men, had come without them. A disastrous retreat ensued.

The other column was not more fortunate. They were attacked and nearly surrounded on

their march: and after offering an ineffectual resistance for some time, they had to fall back in disorder, followed by the enemy, who continued to pursue both parties, strewing the ground with mangled bodies of the dead and dying, almost to the pickets of General Martindell's camp.

To the east our horizon became still more gloomy. The army of Dinapore (appointed to reduce the parent state of Nepal) on which, in the first place, all friendly and hostile eyes had been fixed, was retarded, it appears, by many unforeseen obstacles; so that it had not yet entered the great forest. While the troops lay in the Terrai, or that extensive plain adjoining, and partly belonging to the enemy's frontier, two detachments, consisting of 500 men each, chiefly native infantry, were posted about sixty miles in advance of the army: the one at Pursah, on a spot nearly encompassed by the Berah Nullah, and the other far distant at a place called Summondpore. They had no support to reckon upon in case of their being overpowered by superior numbers. A terrible massacre of both took place on the same night. [*Jan. 1st, 1815.*] The last short sentence contains all that I know of the event. The few who survived could hardly be expected to furnish an intelligible account of such a catastrophe. I know not whether blame might attach to the

commanders of these posts in this revolting sacrifice of human life. But were it so, both have expiated their military errors in a soldier's grave.

General Sullivan Wood, with the army of Benares, was also destined to suffer a reverse, in being repulsed from one of the fortifications in his route. The light company of H. M. 17th foot, making a gallant stand, enabled the rest to draw back in perfect order when it appeared that no offensive operation could be executed. Nearly the whole of this company, however, was killed or wounded, the commanding officer, Capt. Poyntz (now of the 69th regt.) being shot through the chest.

Major-General Sir George Wood shortly afterwards succeeded to the command of the Dinapore force, which on this occasion was considerably augmented. But although these two armies, on the eastern frontier, continued to cause a diversion in favour of the western divisions, they were unable to render any active service during the remainder of this season. Our good fortune began to re-appear with the achievement of, what the Commander-in-chief in India justly called, "the rapid and glorious conquest of Camoan," by Col. Nichols. In a few days this officer had reduced the whole province, with the exceptions of some fortifications, which held out till the end of the campaign.

Amer Sing being regarded, by his own nation, as their ablest general, at the head of their best army, the Nepalese had long been expecting him to strike some signal blow which should terminate the war in favour of his country. It was known afterwards that he had frequently intended to surprise our camps. One party, in particular, was sent by night to Candni, with orders to cut up the battalion, which occupied it. But so impenetrable appeared the complicated array of pickets and guards, with centinels and rounds in perpetual vigilance, that the officer thought it prudent to desist without ever discovering himself. There seems no doubt that this opinion governed the Kadji's conduct, whence, in my opinion, originated the chief error committed by him in the defence of Hindur. In resisting a surprise, especially at night, discipline and subordination are scarcely available. Had the Goorkas, therefore, adopted this system of warfare, by rushing into our lines, after dark, sword in hand, their mode of fighting would have had a decisive advantage.

The recent defeat, which the enemy had suffered on Dibu, seemed to have considerable impression on the Hindurians. Amer Sing sent an envoy to learn of General Ochterlony, what terms he was now authorised to offer him. But as a brief answer informed him that nothing

short of an unconditional surrender of his government would be accepted, the negotiation soon broke off. It is probable, however, that the British general did not contemplate, without concern, the arduous task which he had still to execute.

Before him rose one range of mountains beyond another, generally covered with wood, and divided by deep glens: in other words natural fortresses and defiles capable of being rendered impregnable. Besides six forts yet to be assailed, the Goorkas had innumerable stockades, and the means of multiplying them without end. The most obvious plan of conquest, and what Amer Sing had expected Ochterlony to follow, would have been to reduce all these forts in detail, as the army advanced. But without adverting to the effusion of blood which it must inevitably cost, the campaign would have been protracted to an incalculable length, while it failed to diminish the enemy's strength. For in few instances did either a fort or stockade admit the possibility of surrounding it sufficiently to prevent the escape of the garrison. To take one place, therefore, was only to reinforce another, or to cause the erection of a new one, as sometimes actually happened.

Accordingly a more comprehensive policy, as in the movements on Neher and Dibu, was

now pursued. Amer Sing, after removing his head-quarters to Mungu Kedar, continued to draw his principal resources from the chiefs of Belaspur, whose territory, as well as the further province of Busare, governed in his own name, lie to the N. and N.W. of Malown. General Ochterlony, therefore, lost no time in taking measures for throwing his army between these districts and the principality of Hindur, in order to cut off the Kadji's communication with them.

Brigadier Arnold relieving Col. Thompson on Dibu, received instructions to watch the enemy's motions, and, in case they should decamp, to follow them himself, and take post opposite the city of Belaspur, on the heights west of Malown. The general, with the rest of his force, entering the hollow in which the [Jan. 16.] Gumber flows, marched up the bed of that river, till ascending its western bank, he halted the first night at Sazi, a village to the north of Surajghur. Proceeding westward, he finally posted himself at Butto, which is situated on the north bank of the Gumerora, nearly opposite the centre of the Malown range. No sooner did Amer Sing hear that the passage of the Gumber had been effected than, abandoning Mungu Kedar, he hastened to throw himself into Malown. Meanwhile Lieut. Ross, who had preceded the general in

his march, at the head of 2000 Hindurians, gained possession of the Baudula heights, in the neighbourhood of Belaspur; when learning that the prime minister, in command of the troops, was stockading a hill still nearer the capital, he immediately attacked and put him to the rout. The Rajah, in consequence, with the principal inhabitants, deserted the town and fled across the Setledge.

Feb. 1815.—The combined movements, which were contemplated, would now have been complete and successful, had not circumstances arisen to retard Brigadier Arnold's progress. Among other impediments, a fall of snow, unusually heavy in these regions, continued upwards of fifty hours. But at last when the brigadier reached his destination, at Fulsuri, the government of Belaspur (here called Calur) changing sides, enabled him to encamp under their fort of Ruttunghur, which is divided only by a deep and extensive hollow, from Malown. The other tributary or dependent states soon followed the example of the Calurians, insulating Busare, and leaving the Goorka army without exterior support.

The fort of Malown, or as the Hindurians call it, Rajghur, being considered impregnable was the residence of Amer Sing's family and the depository of his treasure. The heights between it and Surajghur on their eastern

extremity, comprising a line of great extent, were already fortified like those at Ramghur. To this range, after the defection of his auxiliaries, the Kadji now summoned all the troops, who had hitherto been left in the out-works of the other forts.

March.—This step, by leaving their approaches undefended, enabled Ochterlony, in the course of a few weeks, to reduce Ramghur, Jurjura, Tarraghur, and Chumba, with as little loss as he sustained in taking Nallaghur. This important service was performed by a detachment under the command of Lieut.-Col. Cooper, attended by the field-engineer; the artillery being directed by Capt. Webb.

The reader is already acquainted with the chief peculiarities attending such sieges: but some of the instructions, under which Col. Cooper acted, were adapted to the change of circumstances. In place of hazarding the lives of his men in attempting to destroy the enemy, he was enjoined simply to dispossess them; permitting the garrison of each fort to retreat to Malown, where it was believed their numbers might eventually render us service, by producing a famine.

The Goorka force was now circumscribed within comparatively narrow bounds; yet it ceased not to shew its formidable activity, wherever an opportunity invited. Although it

were impossible to prevent the ingress of provisions while the enemy possessed money, the irregulars had been disposed for the purpose of seizing convoys, and deterring the inhabitants of the country from furnishing supplies. The Goorkas attacked a sufficiently strong stockade by night, which was occupied by 800 of these men, without any European officer at their head. The watch, if any had been appointed, was not on the alert, and the rest were asleep, when the Goorkas climbing over the wall, slaughtered as many as they thought fit and rased the works.

April, 1815.—The general had now determined the plan of an attack on the heights; for the purpose of forming a lodgement near the fort of Malown. In order, however, to draw the enemy's attention to the opposite end of the range, he directed a noisy bombardment and a brisk fire of artillery to be kept up for some days on the stockades beneath Surajghur. The field-engineer next, leading a small party by night to an unoccupied eminence, called Ryla, situated between Surajghur and the centre, he gained possession of it without much loss, and immediately threw up some defences. To this place Major Innis proceeded on the following morning, in command of a column, which enabled him to cut off the communication with Surajghur; and to deter

Bukti Tappa, a man famous for his bravery, who commanded the centre of the range, from falling on the rear of our troops during the subsequent conflict.

15th.—By day-break all the disposable force of the army, arranged in columns, was in motion to ascend the western heights. Two of the columns from Ruttunghur were intended principally to create a diversion in favour of the others, though the commanders had instructions to form a junction with the reserve, after destroying the enemy's cantonment, if circumstances should render it practicable. One of these, commanded by Capt. Showers, after crossing the hollow which divides the two forts, was proceeding to pass a small redoubt, on the brow of the opposite hill, when the Goorkas sallied out against him. Seeing their numbers far inferior to his own, he seems to have prevailed on the Seapoys to reserve their fire; but when they were manifesting great reluctance to advance with the bayonet, one of those encounters took place which is seldom exhibited in modern war. A Goorka officer, considerably before his men, was at this time approaching, and Showers hastening to meet him, a single combat took place, in which he slew his adversary, on the space that yet separated the contending parties. Scarcely had this act of personal bravery been achieved,

when Showers was shot, and fell dead. His men fled in irretrievable confusion, followed by a merciless enemy, who destroyed all whom they overtook: nor did they desist from the work of destruction till, coming within range of the Ruttunghur batteries, the artillery made them stay the pursuit. The other column, under Capt. Boyer, marched at the same time against another point of the enemy's out-works. Moving up the hill in compact order, he drove the enemy's skirmishers before him, though they put to flight some irregulares whom he had thrown out in front. In this manner he gained possession of an eminence, sufficiently near a stockade in that quarter, to keep the enemy in a state of alarm. Here, seeing the fate of the co-operating column, he remained on the defensive till withdrawn in the evening. Meanwhile Major Lowry having, on the preceding night, descended with his column from Ruttunghur to the bed of the Gumerora, had moved along the skirts of the mountain beneath Malown; till ascending towards the ridge, he joined the reserve from Butto, at the village of Denntil. This place lies to the east of the fort. The report of fire-arms to the west now announced the progress of Showers and Boyer. Colonel Thompson leaving Major Lowry with the rest of the troops, on the heights above Denntil, put himself at the head

of the light infantry, and prepared to advance. His intention was to seize part of the summit nearer Malown, including three distinct eminences, the farthest of which is within battering distance of the fort. The enemy hidden behind rocks and bushes, redoubled their fire, which our men stood with tolerable firmness; but when the foremost had reached the third eminence the Goorkas drew their swords, and, springing from their cover, closed upon the Seapoys. The number of swordsmen, who made this first attack, did not exceed fifteen. They met with no resistance. For some time European officers were seen forming isolated groupes, with a few men standing round each, but to arrest the panic was beyond their power. The pursuers soon swelled into a multitude, and the havoc was what we might expect such assailants to make among terrified fugitives.

Major Lowry had, in the meantime, made the best possible disposition for retaining his post and checking the career of the Goorkas. Availing himself of his own dexterity as a marksman, (by no means useless in such warfare) he brought down several of the boldest, who continued to press upon those flying before them. His men being mostly drawn up in close order to resist a charge, were ready to give their fire with good effect, when the enemy reached the opposite side of a hollow

which was all that now divided them from this position. The Goorkas at last sheathing their swords, went again into hiding places, and recommenced that sort of irregular fire which is familiarly called sniping.

The pioneers, immediately setting to work, threw up as strong defences around our troops as circumstances would allow, in imitation of a stockade. Elephants had arrived with the field-pieces early in the day; and both sides continued to fire, with short interruptions, during the night. Buckti, instructed to defend his post of Senj against Major Innis, had hitherto been only a spectator of the action; but on being now summoned, he passed down by the side of the Gumber, and entered Malown with his men. Here Amer Sing and he planned an assault on the British position, of which day-break was to be the signal. Both concurred in the expediency of making a desperate effort, in which success might retrieve all their losses; but they did not turn their eyes from the ruin which overhung their fortune. Buckti delivering over his son to the Kadji, promised to come back victorious, or remain dead on the field; and then warning his wives to prepare for the funeral pile, he proceeded to take command of the troops. Amer Sing, and Ram Doss, his youngest son, followed at the same time to witness the

renewal of the battle. [*April 16th.*] The enemy were now silently pushed forward till they formed a kind of semicircle in front, and on the flanks of our post. The access would have been easiest on the Gumerora side, but it was defended there by a body of Hindurians occupying a small stockade. The Goorkas seemed to be so thickly crowded that, when the contest began, the whole mountain appeared as if enveloped in one sheet of flame. Many of them, indeed, commenced their fire within pistol-shot of their opponents. Our guns had been planted in embrasures, commanding the only approaches by which swordsmen could assail the place. A body of these, while their trumpets sounded, set up a hideous yell, and charged along a piece of smooth ground, sloping towards the Gumber. The mouth of the guns being directly in their face, the grape-shot and volleys of musketry swept away such numbers that enough did not remain to complete the attack. Two other parties in succession rushed on to the assault and shared the same fate. After the last repulse Buckti, not yet subdued, had advanced his men on the opposite side of the ridge, to turn our right by dislodging the Hindurians. The confidence which the Seapoys had now acquired encouraged Col. Thompson to act on the offensive. He accordingly ordered out a party of them to

charge with their bayonets, while the irregulars were to make a sortie, sword in hand. The Goorkas, already baffled and dispirited, took to flight. The Hindurians did not lose the opportunity of wreaking a long repressed vengeance on their conquerors, while our Seapoys kept up a brisk fire on the retreating enemy.

Of the European artillery, necessarily much exposed, only one man escaped, with whose assistance Lieut. John Cartwright continued to serve a six-pounder. Another was managed entirely by Lieut. Armstrong of the pioneers, and Lieut. Hutchinson of the engineers, after the serjeant of the former corps had been killed at the gun.

The Goorkas having left the field covered with dead, the body of Buckti was found among the slain, and sent, decently wrapped in a shawl, to Amer Sing. This is an eastern mode of shewing respect for a fallen enemy. Next day two of his wives burned themselves with the corpse, in sight of both armies.

When Amer Sing first saw the different columns marching against him he had made the best arrangement for opposing them. But as this required the dispersion of his force to a weakening extent, it did not leave him the means (calculating on ordinary resistance) of frustrating the intentions, had he possessed

genius to discover the plan, of his adversary. The intrepidity of his common soldiers and the backwardness of ours, giving him a temporary triumph, it was not till Boyer's party had been withdrawn, that he perceived how Thompson and Lowry, by entrenching themselves on Denstil, had attained their object, and ensured the ruin of his cause. In the last daring attempt there can be little doubt that Buckti would have succeeded, had either our stockade or the artillery been wanting. Considering the repeated success of the enemy during this war, with the external confederacy and intestine commotions, which were engendered by the hope of overthrowing the British power, the issue of no action since the battle of Plassey was more important to our Indian empire. The conduct of the native soldiery, in such a crisis, becomes a subject of the highest interest. The reader has seen that the physical mass of the army bent or broke like a useless weapon, whenever a blow was to be struck. The victory is, therefore, attributable not to it, but to the hands by which it was wielded. The general owed the execution of his designs entirely to the unyielding resolution and ability of the officers; qualities which were conspicuously manifested when they had to keep their ground, and throw up fortifications in the face of a victorious enemy.

All the field-officers who commanded columns on this occasion, were afterwards honoured by their Sovereign with the Companionship of the Bath.

General Ochterlony, already gazetted as a Knight-commander for former services, was created a Baronet.

The exultation of all, now anticipating an honourable termination to unwonted exertions, was repressed by the death of the field-engineer. He whose enterprize and scientific labours had lessened the toils of the army, in conducting it over so many hostile and unknown tracts, did not live to witness its final triumph.

Having been exposed, during some months of unremitting assiduity, to the extremes of heat and cold, by day and night, he did not pause till after the victory of the 15th, when ultimate success seemed no longer doubtful. It was then that he felt the first attack of a fever, which in a few days, bore to his bloodless grave, at the age of 24, an officer of as much worth and promise as could distinguish one of subaltern rank. Possessed of a mind with qualifications, capable of attaining the highest distinctions of his profession, Lawtie's unobstrusive manner could have enabled him, in using delegated authority, to advise without humiliating his superior officers. Such a talent can be appreciated by those only who

know the defects of our military system, in many respects excellent. Where seniority alone raises to command, age must impair the abilities of some before they attain high rank : and though the list will always furnish a fit commander to an army, those at the heads of brigades and regiments cannot all be selected.

To record its sense of Lieut. Lawtie's services, the army went into mourning; and afterwards erected a monument to his memory in the Cathedral Church of Calcutta, where it is now to be seen.

Amer Sing, though perfectly aware that his fate was now decided, had various reasons for delaying his capitulation. Ambition and avarice, if not the same passion in this person's mind, were qualities equally inherent. Though only a Viceroy in name he had lived and ruled as an independent Prince. No revenue had ever been remitted by him to Catmandu: and their allotments of land having yielded nothing since the beginning of the campaign, his troops were in arrears. Trusting, therefore, that short allowances of provisions would, in time, compel his men to forfeit their claim to a settlement, by deserting, he indulged in some indefinite hopes, that an old friendship with General Ochterlony would, in the end, obtain favourable terms for himself. During the protracted negotiation, the elephants had carried up to

the heights two brass twelve-pounders, under which the walls of Malown were slowly crumbling, and when a great portion of the Goorkas had enlisted under our banner, the Kadji submitted to the dictates of his conqueror. On this occasion Amer Sing made a formal surrender of all that remained of his government between the Gogra and Sitledge. The fort of Iaituck was included, in which Runjore had hitherto held out against the continued efforts of the besieging army. The Kadji himself, with his family, was permitted to return to Catmanda, carrying off his private property, which, however realized, was, after all, an inconsiderable fortune for a man of his rank.

The influence of a son, not hitherto mentioned, who was one of the Rajah's ministers, protected Amer Sing at the court of Nepal. Here, it is said, his advice determined the wavering counsels of the government to renew the war, and "to make no peace with the Christians." As he had often manifested, together with some high-minded qualities, a superstitious and vindictive spirit in the days of his prosperity, it was not likely to forsake him now. This man, a soldier from his infancy, did not seek nor obtain the command of an army when his country was invaded; but retiring to a temple which he had founded in his youth, he died shortly after the termination of the war.

BEFORE leaving these picturesque and beautiful regions, I shall offer a few concise remarks concerning their importance to the Company's dominions.

Though the soil be in some places scanty, its capability is attested in others by luxuriant vegetation and many forests of tall trees. On a surface presenting so much variety, most of the useful and ornamental productions of Europe and Asia might be reared. A gentleman, whose abilities and opportunities qualify him to judge, is of opinion that the tea plant could be cultivated here with success. The temperate and salubrious climate of these mountains denote them the site of a future colony, destined to send forth a healthy and energetic race of Asiatic Britons, ready to afford support and succour to the government of the plains. In other parts of India Europeans can scarcely submit to manual labour: but here no physical causes would hinder them from prosecuting the humblest industry. The grand limits which nature has assigned to the Indian Empire, however colossal the dimensions may appear, are the Indus, the Ocean, and the Himalayahs. The two first are defensible boundaries; but the regions between the last and the plains might be converted into an impregnable fortress, with a nation within its walls.

STAFF of the Army which invaded Nepal, in 1816, under the command of Major-General Sir David Ochterlony:—

Secretary,..... Capt. Edmund Cartwright.
 Aid-de-Camp, — Arthur Poynty.
 Assistant Adjt.-General,..... — W. L. Watson.
 Assist. Quarter-Master-General — J. Pickersgill.
 Assist. Commissary-General, .. — R. H. Cunliffe.

Officers commanding Brigades:—

Colonel Kelly, H. M. 24th Foot, 1st Brigade.
 Lieutenant-Colonel Nichol, — 66th — 2nd —
 ————— Miller, .. — 87th — 3rd —
 ————— Dick, .. Bengal Infantry, 4th —
 Major George Mason, commanding Artillery.

Dec. 1815.—Lieut.-Col. Bradshaw, acting as political agent in the Terrai, had concluded a treaty of peace with the Nepal government, which was confirmed, with public formalities, by the Governor-General in Council, on the 2nd of December. In this document it was stipulated that the Company should retain possession of all the territories occupied by their troops, at the termination of the war.

Raj Guru, a Bramin of Benares, being chosen mediator, to explain the articles for both parties, was dispatched to Catmanda with the treaty, in order to get it ratified by the Rajah.

I know not whether this person was himself over-reached, or whether he perfidiously abetted the policy of the Nepalese court, in attempt-

ing to consume the season for hostilities in idle negotiation. Such is the popular opinion respecting the insalubrity of the great forest, and the vallies between our frontier and the Goorka capital, that the direct communication was wont to be suspended from the middle of March to the beginning of September. Had the commencement of the campaign, therefore, been delayed a few weeks longer, the climate might have proved fatal to our army. Raj Guru left Catmanda in the beginning of February, inducing the political agent to believe that he was bringing the ratified treaty, and after a rather dilatory journey to the British camp at Bullvi, he announced the enemy's intention to renew the war.

Feb. 1816.—This event having been apprehended for some time past, the army was nearly ready for the field. Sir David Ochterlony, already appointed to the command, now assumed the Political authority also, as the Governor-General's Agent, and was invested with full power to treat with Nepal. The force under his orders consisted, of his Majesty's 24th, 66th, and 87th regiments, about 10,000 native infantry, and a numerous train of artillery. The troops were divided into four brigades, commanded respectively by colonels Kelly, Nichol, Miller, and Dick. The whole were immediately put in motion to invade the enemy's country simulta-

neously, in different quarters. Brigadier Kelly marched towards Bagwanpoor, Nichol on Ramnaghur, while the third and fourth Brigades, under the personal conduct of the General, penetrated from Simulabassa. [Feb. 10th] After establishing a fortified depôt at this place, he entered the great Sal forest, which the Nepalese used to consider the protecting boundary of their country. It is eleven miles in breadth: and to me it is not wonderful that Asiatic minds, always prone to superstitious impressions, should receive them here, in believing this forest raised by the Deities for their protection. It is with little exception a dreary flat, presenting one unvaried aspect of tall trees, seldom possessing enough of foliage to shade the ground, which is in some places naked, and in others, littered with rank or rotten vegetation. No breath of wind perhaps ever reaches the interior parts. No animals inhabit it, nor is even the voice of a bird to be heard. It was felt as an agreeable transition when the troops emerged from this scenery to ascend the bed of the Bichakore river. They encamped the same evening near a brick building, serving as a caravansary and storehouse, which was immediately stockaded and converted into another depôt. This post was known by the name of Bichakoh. Four days were spent here in acquiring information respecting the further route

and the enemy's positions. All the frequented passes of the first range, called Churiaghati, formidable by nature and strongly defended, were deemed impregnable. A passage was at last discovered by which these posts could be turned, which the Goorkas considering impracticable, had entirely neglected. [14th] The third Brigade left its ground at nine o'clock in the evening, the General marching on foot at the head of the line. When about a mile from Bichakoh, it entered by single files a deep and narrow ravine called Balukola. Through five miles of this passage, three thousand men moved with the silence of a funeral procession. The lofty banks being clothed with trees, their branches from opposite sides in some places intermingled above, in others the clear moonlight shewed tremendous rocks at a great height, rising over the column in cliffs and precipices. The only sounds which interrupted the stillness, were caused by the axes, in removing some trees, which had grown or fallen across the way. By three o'clock, the troops ascending from hence, proceeded over ground of various character, and finally entered a nameless water-course, which led them to the bottom of a steep acclivity, at least three hundred feet high. The advance guard, clambering up with the assistance of the bushes, occupied the surrounding eminences, and the brigade follow-

ing, took quiet possession of the Churiaghati heights about seven in the morning.

A fortunate general has no criticism to fear. This enterprize was doubtless prompted by urgent necessity; and as its success not only abridged the probable period of the campaign from months to weeks, but in all likelihood saved the army from an inglorious retreat on the commencement of the hot and sickly season; the chances of failure, which it behoved to calculate, are readily overlooked. There can be little doubt, however, that twenty men, on the banks of the defile, might have destroyed the whole brigade, without exposing themselves to much danger. Such perilous expeditions are justifiable only when undertaken as the means of averting disaster.

Feb. 15th.—The fourth brigade marched that morning from Buhakoh,* and encamped within sight of the Goorka posts, commanding the direct road over the Churiaghati.

16th.—The enemy now heard with consternation of the General's movement, and dreading lest he should immediately fall on their rear, or pass to Catmanda, all the Goorka force on this range made a precipitate retreat to Macwanpore, leaving the road open for their invaders to follow.

The third brigade, after gaining the heights, advanced about five miles, where it bivouacked

* q. Bichakoh?

during four days, awaiting the arrival of the Commissariat stores, in a wood beside a stream of good water, known by the unmusical name of Chuckri Makri Milla. The contrast which a European regiment newly arrived in India, generally forms with one long stationed in the country, was well exemplified here. After the fatiguing march of the preceding night, the soldiers of the 87th regiment, who had not yet slept or eaten, on reaching the ground began to climb the trees, of which they lopped off the branches, and in a few hours made comfortable huts, or bowers, for the general, their officers, and themselves. Meanwhile other Europeans, less actively employed, expressed some regret at the absence of the provisioner and the camp equipage. Even the Seapoys, no where accustomed to good barracks and the attendance of menials, shewed rather more inclination to prepare for cooking, than to imitate the simple officiousness of the uninitiated Christians.— These occurrences are by no means mentioned as derogating from the character of particular corps; I hold them to be illustrations of general facts, of which almost every army, taking the field in India, exhibits examples.

The industry of the pioneers having at last rendered the road passable for the elephants and bullocks of the Commissariat, the General was enabled to march on the 20th, when he

proceeded to Etounda. A considerable quantity of grain was seized at this place, where there is an extensive storehouse. Etounda is situated on the Rapti, the most beautiful river, perhaps, in the east. Its northern bank, a mountainous ridge, broken by the deep tracks of many rivulets, is clothed from base to summit with luxuriant forest. The opposite side is much lower, inclining to an easy slope, which terminates in detached knolls, and small vallies on the border of the stream. The water itself, in the deepest pools, is perfectly transparent and literally swarms with fish. On the arrival of the fourth brigade from Churiagati, a depôt being established here, five companies were left in a stockade for its protection.

Feb. 27th.—The two brigades marched in the morning, and towards evening encamped in the valley of Makwanpore. A range of inconsiderable hills bearing the same general appellation, rose in front of the camp, having the fort and a strong stockade eastward, beyond our right, and a small village directly opposite our left. This last mentioned place was, for some unknown reason, evacuated next morning by the Goorkas, and immediately occupied by four companies of Seapoys and forty Europeans. From hence the Quarter-Master-General proceeded with a reconnoitering party, to explore the road along the ridge.

leading to the fort. The ground continuing nearly bare for about two hundred paces, he posted a small party on an eminence that overlooks a hollow, beyond which the jungle commences. Advancing half a mile further, Capt. Pickersgill stationed some men on an advantageous spot within the wood. He was still moving eastward with but few attendants, when a body of the enemy, supposed to be a thousand strong, was observed rapidly ascending the north side of the hill. The Goorkas succeeding in cutting off his retreat, and immediately retracing his steps, they dislodged successively the two parties which he had just posted. Pickersgill descending the south side of the range, made good his retreat to the camp, with the loss of one European, who fell alive into the enemy's hands and was barbarously murdered.

The Goorkas had now retaken, sword in hand, the whole of the naked ridge west of the hollow, but the village still held out. The greatest loss sustained on the occasion was that of Lieut. Terrey, a gallant young man, who always courting danger with enthusiasm, was cut down in an attempt to repulse the attack.

Though this enterprize on the part of the enemy had not been anticipated, a battalion of native infantry was in readiness to be dis-

patched as a reinforcement when the firing began. At the same time the trumpets sounded in the great stockade, and two thousand Goorkas poured along the heights to join the assailants. Four companies of the 87th regt. and the 2nd battalion of the 12th N. I. were next ordered off to the village: while the artillery was directed to bombard the ridge, with the view of retarding those swarms that continued to hurry along it to the scene of action. In all these measures the General saw himself closely imitated by his adversary, whose guns kept up a noisy cannonade on the flank of the last party as it ascended the hill. On reaching the summit, and forming a junction with the rest of the troops, the Europeans leading, they charged the enemy and drove them at the point of the bayonet beyond the hollow. As a farther pursuit would have been very hazardous on such ground, the Goorkas could not be prevented from cowering down in the jungle, and commencing a destructive fire on their opponents.

Finding that few of their cannon could be brought to bear on the top of the hill, they turned two of them on Sir David Ochterlony and his staff, who stood conspicuously below, in front of the line, which was under arms. The four-pound shot struck some tents, and continued during, perhaps half an hour, to fall

in all parts of the camp, but did remarkably little injury. A servant of the general's who attended him with an inkstand, was I believe the only person killed in the valley.

Some field-pieces had been occasionally directed on different parts of the jungle since three o'clock. They had no effect however upon the marksmen, who remained there in concealment.

It being now perceived that the Goorkas were getting exhausted and dispirited, Brigadier Miller was dispatched from head-quarters with the 2nd battalion 8th N. I. to terminate the action if possible before sunset, when in that country, it soon becomes dark. This corps passing the hollow and raising a general shout, advanced at a quick pace to the nearest of the enemy's guns, which they took. The Goorkas making very little resistance to this charge, fled through the thickets in all directions, abandoning many of their dead and wounded. The victory was at length complete: and after being fairly put to the route, the fugitives were not pursued further. The conflict had lasted from ten in the morning till five in the afternoon. The loss on both sides was no doubt considerable, though in no proportion to the advantage gained on ours. Mr. Prinsep, who must have had every official information on the subject, reckons the loss of the Nepal

army at 800 men. My notes are, it may seem, strangely defective, on a point which an historian of battles usually records with anxious precision.

The Goorkas in this campaign, controuled by the Prime Minister, and led by a nameless Commander, were much inferior, in active valour, to the veterans of Hindur when impelled by the energy of Amer Sing. Believing the fate of their country to depend on the issue of the day, they continued long and obstinately to snipe, or fire deliberately from cover, upon their adversaries who were necessarily a good deal exposed. But *fortune*, in their own phrase, *follows the edge of the sword*. The bayonets of the 87th regiment had indeed spread terror amongst them, and might have withstood tenfold numbers, had the swordsmen returned to the charge on the arrival of the reinforcements.

The native corps which performed the most brilliant part on this occasion, where all acted well, contained a great many men, who had recently returned from foreign service at the Mauritius and Java. It has been observed that those expeditions diminished the force of their superstitious prejudices, and rendered the Seapoys more manly, careless, profligate, in a word, more like European soldiers.

By a succession of couriers, placed on pur-

pose, the account of this battle reached Cat-
 manda in a few hours. It was rapidly followed
 by the news of another defeat which they sus-
 tained from Brigadier Kelly near the fort of
 Hurriarpoor. Here Runjore, the defender of
 Jaituck, forfeited all his renown by an early
 flight, leaving those companions of his brighter
 fortune, whom he had distinguished by cres-
 cents on their turbans, and called the *Band of
 the Moon*.

March 1st, 1816.—The Lal Mohur, as it is
 called, the Rajah's Seal of State, having been
 affixed without delay to the old treaty, an
 envoy was dispatched with it to Sir David
 Ochterlony, whom he reached before day-
 break. The clause of this document relative
 to the cession of territory, would in its original
 application, have deprived Nepal of very little
 more than her conquered provinces west of the
 Gogra. But now that *our troops actually occu-
 pied* the valley of Makwanpore, its strict inter-
 pretation would extend the British frontier be-
 yond the Rapti. Without any intention,
 therefore, to reject the present submission, the
 General embraced the opportunity of causing
 reparation to be made for the contumacy, that
 the Raja had manifested towards the Governor-
 General, in refusing to ratify the treaty, after
 his Lordship had publicly signed it, and notified
 the event to all the courts of India. The Envoy

did not hesitate to throw himself at the conquerors feet, and implore him to accept the treaty in the name of his master.

This act of oriental diplomacy passed in the presence of all the Vakeels, or accredited agents who attended the camp, on the part of different Indian princes.

To this narrative of the Goorka War, it was my intention to subjoin the official returns of the killed and wounded in the various actions. These however are not, it seems, procurable in this country. It would have afforded me a real satisfaction to shew, that two campaigns, of equal importance, had never been brought to a successful conclusion with so little bloodshed. From those who estimate a general's merit by the numbers whom he has slain or led to destruction, Sir David Ochterlony can claim no praise. No vain glorious assaults, no fatal contempt of the enemy, no conflagrations, no arbitrary executions, marked his route through hostile countries. Disregarding, with the mind of a statesman, the brilliancy of Military exploits, and attending exclusively to the efficiency of measures, a battle was his last resort.

THE first events of the war with Nepal excited no little alarm in the British Provinces. The enemy's success was not the unresisted irruption of a hostile neighbour on some un-

guarded point of our frontier. It was the absolute discomfiture of three, out of five, well appointed armies, which had begun offensive operations in consequence of the mature deliberation of the Council, and after the completion of the Commander-in-Chief's arrangements. The Goorkas were in fact the least prepared. The fears of the most timid were finally justified by the Mahratta confederacy abroad, and two insurrections at home, offering a tardy and ill managed co-operation with the enemy. The truth was then apparent, that the British dominion, extending over nominal allies, unwilling tributaries, and discontented subjects, exists by the dread alone, which these entertain of our military prowess. Hence arises the paramount importance of the efficiency of the Indian army. It will be readily allowed that foreign states do not remain in voluntary subjection; but many may believe on what they deem good authority, that the natives of the Company's territory are happy, and satisfied with their condition. Distrusting accordingly, the evidence of my own senses, and a thousand proofs furnished by others, I shall here appeal to those principles which are known to actuate human nature in almost every stage of society.

Princes and nobles will ever wish the subversion of any authority that excludes them from the seats of ambition and power.

In recently subjected states, which have been reclaimed from anarchy, the establishment of order disgusts all the daring and restless spirits of the lower classes, by limiting their aspirations to the rewards of peaceful industry. In our domestic provinces again, the institutions of civilization come in daily collision with the feelings and habits of semi-barbarism. Virtue and vice are practised in all countries, but in very unequal proportions. If in England, for instance, ninety-five in the hundred are virtuous men, the numbers must be reversed in Bengal, where ninety-five of the hundred will be found irreclaimably immoral.

Let us imagine a colony formed of the vicious and turbulent portion of our own society; suppose all the highway-men, smugglers, sharpers, thieves, and harlots of the empire, transported to some uninhabited island. Let a handful of foreigners, administering vigilantly a mild government and equitable laws, try to reduce these persons to industrious peasants and peaceful artisans: will they not join the first pirate or robber who appears on the coast?

Ages must revolve, and generations pass away, before the moral habits of a people can be materially changed.

Situated as Hindostan is, no system of good government would satisfy its inhabitants. In the mean time, every comet foreboding change

will be worshipped. To reign in the hearts of such a people is impossible. Force, imminent and apparent to their minds, is the only attribute of power which they can respect or obey. The native army is consequently the support and stay of the British empire in India. Policy strongly inculcates the propriety of fostering and strengthening that opinion of their invincibility, which enables 200,000 men to hold 60,000,000 in subjection. A foreign invasion, a body of insurgents gaining a single battle, by breaking the spell, might annihilate in one month the work of centuries.

In physical qualities the Bengal seapoys are nearly equal to British soldiers: but they are deplorably deficient in mental energy. Europeans are at once the sensorium and the nerves, the source and channels, of that intellectual power which regulates and impels the mass of the army. Without Europeans the disciplined natives would do little more service than a regiment of horse without riders.*

The great defect of the Bengal troops at pre-

* It will be obvious that enthusiasm, and the cold sense of duty, actuate men's conduct very differently. But much active energy is always sacrificed to the utility of discipline. The Goorka force, for example, may be compared to water in its natural state of fluidity, possessing the quaquaversal power: while the Company's army resembles the same element when reduced to the solidity of ice.

sent consists in a paucity of British commissioned and petty officers. Were all the Europeans, instead of being separately embodied, diffused through the native regiments, the army would, in my opinion, be immensely improved in its general efficiency.

One innovation which I consider an essential improvement has already begun in the Company's service. All paymasters and commissaries are, not in rank only, but in reality, military men. The various departments of an army ought undoubtedly to consist of homogeneous materials, susceptible of the same impressions, and acting on them in unison. All gentlemen indispensably connected with it should be in knowledge, designation, and immunities, military officers. On the same principle all the permanent camp followers ought to be made soldiers. Thus, while each was continued in the performance of whatever he could do best, an additional force would become available in every emergency. The division of labour need not enter extensively into the military system. To the Roman Legionaries "the spade and the pick-axe were no less familiar than the sword and the pilum."

Were the whole of our seapoys enlisted on the condition of their learning to employ these ignoble instruments, I am certain that their usefulness would be much encreased: and even

the dignity of caste might be taught to imitate the conquerors of the world. *

The seapoys composing the present corps of pioneers, are of the same classes with those in the infantry regiments, who pretend that any kind of manual labour degrades them.—The assumptions of vanity and laziness are too extensively admitted in the Bengal army. To counteract this evil, a council of eminent Pundits, superintended by some learned European, ought to define the privileges and obligations of the different castes. Their decisions might then be sanctioned by government, and circulated with the articles of war.

With some radical defects in war, the native soldiers are, in time of peace, distinguishable as a race superior to the rest of their countrymen. The Company's army has been the best school of morality in the East. The respectable situation which Europeans hold, as non-commissioned officers in native corps, has a most beneficial influence on the character of these men likewise. The moral condition of the privates in their own regiments is often deplorable. If a return were procurable of all the British soldiers whose lives have been forfeited to the laws of their country in India, within these last fifty years, I believe it would be the most sad and mortifying document in existence.

These men are not impaired or enervated in

* See Note, in page 55.

mental and bodily faculties, by a hot climate, as some in this country suppose: but on the contrary, they become turbulent and ferocious, addicted to the worst excesses, regardless of their own lives and ready to destroy those of others. This description may indicate rather an excess of martial spirit. It behoves a wise and benevolent government to find the means of restraining it in peace, and directing it in war.

The two classes of people seem happily calculated to neutralize the bad qualities of each other. Standing mutually in the relation of power and machinery, which are useless when separated, they must be connected and balanced to act with efficacy. While the uncounted millions of the East supply matter, the West may endue it with mind. It is in this combination, that her Oriental dominions present to Britain the elements of a mighty army; capable not only of repelling all foreign aggression, but of executing loftier schemes of ambition than the devastators of Asia have ever realised.

NOTES.

It would be an excess of pedantry, worthy of *Martinus Scriblerus*, to discipline modern armies after the fashion of the ancients. Yet while it is proper to concede something to superstition and national habits, we ought always to remember what humanity has accomplished and is still capable of.

When a Roman army was in motion every soldier carried on his back kitchen utensils, instruments of fortification, seventeen, but laterly fifteen, days provisions, and often a dozen stakes; the whole amounting to sixty pounds weight, besides arms, which a legionary considered part of his person. Under this load the men usually marched twenty miles daily, at the rate of three miles an hour. On reaching their ground every soldier commenced the work allotted to him. The camp, though only pitched for one night, was made to resemble a fortified town. "The rampart itself," says Gibbon "was usually twelve feet high, armed with a line of strong and intricate palisades, and defended by a ditch twelve feet in depth, as well as in breadth." From the "snows of Caledonia to the sands of Egypt" the same regulations seem to have been enforced, and the same incredible exertions required, at all seasons, even during the prosperous period of the Empire.

The soldiers were not allowed to have slaves: and in the better days of the Republic camp followers (*Lixæ*) were scarcely known. The legionaries did every thing; nor were public servants of all work thought meanly of, until Augustus introduced his *Exauctoratio*, which restricting

the duties of a veteran to *mere fighting*, after he had passed through sixteen campaigns, opened the door to many abuses.

An army of ten thousand Romans could never be seen lying inactive and discontented, waiting for two hundred people, of a different class, to prepare the road for them. Without requiring the bribe of extra pay and public thanks, to pull a rope, all the men off duty would have done their best; and, though not expert pioneers, they might perhaps accomplish that work, say of a week, in one day, and thereby save a great deal of time to the General and much expence to the State.

See the works of Adam, Kennet, Gibbon, and the authors to whom they refer.

I regret that the attack, in which the garrison of Surajghur was dispersed on its way to Malown, by Lieut. William Murray at the head of some irregulars, has not been mentioned in the proper place. The capture of the stockades near Churiaghati Pass, by Captain Tickell, of the Engineers, is in like manner left out: my notes of the dates and particulars of both these affairs being accidentally lost.

There may be other omissions which certainly originate in no ungenerous intention.

F I N I S .

